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ABSTRACT 
Five indices measuring economic class situation were 
compared to identify persons occupying inconsistent posi- 
tions on different dimensions, In the aggregate, incon- 
sistency on "pure" economic ,class variables produced no 
partisan preference while inconsistants-on mixed status- 
class dimensions tended to prefer the Democratic party. 
Among persons under 45, class inconsistency did produce a 
preference for the Republican party, a partial confirma- 
tion of Wiley's hypothesis of American political behavior. 
An explanation for the differential effects of status and 
class inconsistency was proposed in terms of shifting 
arenas of political competition from class to status 
struggles. 
INTRODUCTION 
American p o l i t i c a l  behavior has  proved notor ious ly  un- 
y i e l d i n g  t o  economic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  Marxian not ions  of c l a s s  
c o n f l i c t  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  s o c i e t y  do n o t  account f o r  t h e  r a d i c a l -  
i s m  of a g r a r i a n  populism and r e l a t i v e  p o l i t i c a l  p a s s i v i t y  (bu t  
economic mi l i t ancy)  of t h e  t r a d e  union movement. Economic 
determinism, it has been argued, does n o t  expla in  American 
p o l i t i c a l  behavior s i n c e  t h e  r h e t o r i c  of economics has served 
p o l i t i c i a n s  only  a s  a  "convent ional  shorthand" f o r  i s s u e s  
fundamentally p o l i t i c a l  o r  moral (Drucker, 1968) .  Research 
seeking t o  r e l a t e  economic s e l f - i n t e r e s t  t o  p o l i t i c a l  involve- 
ment a l s o  f a i l e d  t o  show s i g n i f i c a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  while 
another  study showed bas ic  s o c i o l o g i c a l  v a r i a b l e s  account f o r  
more va r i ance  i n  p a r t i s a n  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  than  do economic 
v a r i a b l e s  (Lindenfeld,  1964; Segal and Knoke, 1970) .  The posi-  
t i o n  i n  t h i s  paper i s  t h a t  c l a s s  and c l a s s  c o n f l i c t  i n  t h e  
United S t a t e s  must be viewed a p a r t  from a  r i g i d  economic 
determinism. We w i l l  compare t h e o r e t i c a l  c l a s s  concepts of 
Marx and Weber and propose a  t h i r d  concept tak ing  i n t o  con- 
s i d e r a t i o n  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  c l a s s  and s t a t u s .  
THE CLASSICAL CLASS CONCEPTS 
Karl  Marx's- concept of s o c i a l . c l a s s  i s  n o t  presented 
s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  i n  any s i n g l e  work; t h e  b r i e f  review here  i s  
ga thered  from severa l  sources ,  acknowledged where appropr ia t e .  
For Marx, economic product.ion provides  men with d e f i n i t e  r e l a -  
t i o n s h i p s  bo th - ind i spensab le  and independent of t h e i r  w i l l .  
Economic ranking  c r i t e r i a .  such a s  p rope r ty , . i ncome ,  and sou rce  
of  income.are  t h e  r e s u l t  of t h e  s t r u c t u r e - o f  economic condi-  
t i o n s , ~ u l t i m a t e l y  devolv ing  from p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  p roduc t ion .  
(Dahrendorf , 1959 : 11) . The r e l a t i o n s .  o f ,  p roduc t ion  c o n s t i -  
t u t e  t he .  economic s t r u c t u r e .  of  s o c i e t y  o u t  of  which,grow l e g a l  
and p o l i t i c a l  s u p e r s t r u c t u r e s  (Marx, 1904: 291-292). While 
Marx recognized t h a t  t h e  b a s i c  c o n d i t i o n  behind produc t ion  i n  - 
t h e  a b s t r a c t  is  p r o p e r t y , . h e : s o u g h t . t o  unders tand p r o p e r t y  i n  
bourgeois  s o c i e t y  a s  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  o f  c a p i t a l  and wage l a b o r  
(Dahrendorf ,  1959: 1 2 ) .  The s t r a t i f y i n g  p r i n c i p l e  i s . owner -  
s h i p  o r  exc lus ion  from ownership of  t h e  means  of p roduc t ion ;  
t h e  s o c i a l  consequences a r e  fundamental ly  two a n d . o n l y t w o  
c l a s s e s - - t h e  owners and t h e  l a b o r i n g  c l a s s b  
There i s . a  c o n s t a n t . t e n d e n c y  i n  c a p i t a l i s t  s o c i e t i e s  f o r  
c a p i t a l  t o  s e p a r a t e  from l a b o r  and c o n c e n t r a t e  i n t o  i nc reas ing -  
l y  l a r g e r .  agg rega t e s  : 
"The spec i f i c . economic  form i n -  which unpaid s u r p l u s  
l a b o r  i s  pumped o u t  of t h e .  d i r e c t  producers  d e t e r -  
mines t h e  r e l a t i o n  of dominat ion and. s e r v i t u d e . . .  
Upon t h i s  b a s i s ,  however., i s  founded t h e  e n t i r e .  
s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  economic community, which grows 
o u t  of  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  of p roduc t ion  i t s e l f ,  and 
consequent ly  i t s  s p e c i f i c  p o l i t i c a l  form.".  
(Bottomore, 1956: 99 ) .  
C l a s s  fo rmat ion  t h u s  a r i s e s  o u t  of  t h e  d i v i s i o n - o f  l a b o r , ,  
and t h e  antagonism between dominant and s u b o r d i n a t e  c l a s s e s  
t a k e s  t h e  form.of  s t r u g g l e  i n  t h e  l a b o r  market  over  t h e  p r i c e  
of  labor: The s t r u g g l e  becomes p o l i t i c a l  when wage-workers 
i n  l a r g e - s c a l e  i n d u s t r y ,  f i n d i n g  t h e m s e l v e s i n  a  common s i t u a -  
t i o n  ( c l a s s  i n  i t s e l f ) ,  o r g a n i z e  and u n i t e  t o  defend t h e i r  
class interests (class of itself) (Bottomore, 1956: 186-188). 
While Marx largely confined his analysis and discussion 
of the class. conflict to the. labor market, -Max Weber- sought. 
to broaden the scope of economic interpretation of political 
action. He not only broadened.the concept of stratification 
to include non-economic factors, but also demonstrated that 
class~conflict is not- confined solely to relationships in the 
labor market,but occurs as well in commodity and credit 
markets (Weber in Mills, ,1960: 121-135) . 
Weber conceived- classes as occurring among persons-with 
a specific causal component of their life chances,which is 
represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession 
of goods and income opportunities. In all three-markets, the 
, 
class. strat.ification principle is. th6 properties-non-proper~ied 
relationship. 
The simple determinism of the economic market, principle 
in class.actions is complicated by the existence of status 
groups.. These groups- are normally .communities in which the 
chief component is life fate determined by. specific positive. 
or negative social estimations of honor. Status rank may be. 
knit to economic class situation, but property is- not a 
definitive relation since both propertied and non-propertied 
individuals may belong to the same status group. 
"With some, over-simplification, one might-thus- say 
that 'classes' are stratified according to their 
relations to the production and-.acquisition of 
goods; whereas 'status groups'. are stratified 
according to the principles of their consumption 
of goods as represented by. special 'styles'of.life'." 
(Weber, 1960: 128). 
The political results of stratification by both,class and 
status are more complex than in Marxian analysis; party 
interests may be determined either through 'class' or 'status' 
situations and party composition and goals will vary according 
to the type of communal activity they hope to influence. 
Weber recognized that while class situations is created 
from unambiguous economic market interests, "class-interest" 
is much more ambiguous; class action does not occur unless 
the facts and results of the class situation are made dis- 
tinctly recognizable to persons in a particular class situa- 
tion. Historically, he believed, class conflict has shifted 
from consumption credit to competitive struggles in the 
commodity market to the price wars in the labor market; this 
last conflict was the one upon which Marx had concentrated a 
single-market notion of class behavior. 
With the more complex analysis of economic class behavior 
that- Weber ' s theory provides, . we .are- now:. able., to make a further 
penetration of the political consequences of economic structure 
in the United States. 
THE CLASS 1NCONSISTENCY.HYPOTHESIS. 
If the economic class bases for pol.itica1 organization 
are more complex.than the dichotomy,posited by Marx, the class 
situation of each.individua1 may. not be identical from.market 
to market. Wiley (1967) has suggested that- American political 
history is. resistant to rigidly determinist interpretation 
because class confl.ict occurs along three. major axes--Weber8s 
labor, commodity and credit-markets. 
Anyone who participates in all.three markets is a member 
of three distinct. economic. classes and. may participate in 
class conflict in each class: situation: Wiley.focuses upon 
inconsistency in the class categories: an individual may be 
propertied in some mar,kets..and non-propertied in another.. 
Such an inconsistency in class situations is presumed to 
involve a conflict of economic interest for the person (Wiley, 
1967: 5 3 2 ) .  Wiley believes inconsistencies in individual 
class attributes in all three market-classes may become so 
widespread and structured in such =-way as to produce incon- 
sistencies in the class-situations of major socio-economic 
groups. 
An historically inconsistent class structure in the 
United States has produced different subordinate classes 
along the three axes of conflict. The American workers' aver- 
sion to socialism and the farmers' militant populism are 
different responses by groups with inconsistent class attri- 
butes, thus diluting their radicalism and preventing class 
action. The workers' wage conflict in the labor market was 
alien to the farmers who were debtors in the credit market and 
sellers in the commodity market (Wiley, 1967: 533-535) .  
Wiley's investigation of modern political protest, 
particularly the radical right, leads him to identify support- 
ers of Sen. Joseph McCarthy as occupying inconsistent positions 
in class attributes. Small businessmen, manual workers with 
a stake in capital property, retired persons and even the 
salaried middle class he shows may be mixed types like the 
farmers. These circumstances lead him to formulate as a 
general hypothesis: 
"People with inconsistent class attributes are 
especially prone to support right-wing groups." 
(Wiley, 1967: 536). 
Similar consequences have been empirically observed among 
socially mobile persons from the working-class into the 
middle-class (Lopreato, 1967; Bendix and Lipset, 1960: 64ff). 
Such mobility processes represent class inconsistencies over 
time; there is reason to believe- that simultaneous-incon- 
sistencies in class situations may show the same political 
effects. 
STATUS INCONSISTENCY AND CLASS INCONSISTENCY 
The concept of class inconsistency introduced by Wiley 
and to some extent by Landecker (1960) parallels the concept 
of status inconsistency which-has occupied many writers on 
stratification over the last 15 years. Status inconsistency 
may be conceived as,a non-vertical configuration involving 
several dimensions--occupation, education, income, race, 
religion,.and ethnicity--some of.which are,directly related to 
economic class attributes. Research- in recent years has 
focused on the interaction effects of two or more inconsistent 
status dimensions upon patterns of.behavior (Lenski, 1954; 
Jackson, 1962). An individual holding inconsistent status 
across several dimensions is likely to experience ambiguous, 
unclear and conflicting "normative expectations !' : wishing to 
b e  honored and g r a n t e d  d e f e r e n c e  f o r  h i s  h i g h e r  s t a t u s ,  i n s t e a d  
he  o f t e n  f i n d s  h imse l f  judged i n  t h e  community by h i s  lower 
s t a t u s .  S e v e r a l  s t u d i e s  have sugges t ed  t h a t  a  main consequence 
of  such  normat ive  c o n f l i c t s  w i t h i n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  psycho- 
l o g i c a l  stress a r i s i n g  from c r o s s - p r e s s u r e s  t o  behave i n  d i s -  
c r e p a n t  ways. The f r u s t r a t i o n  and u n c e r t a i n t y  o f  n o t  be ing  
a b l e  t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  of  o t h e r s ,  o f  o n e s e l f  and o f  
o n e s e l f  by o t h e r s  may l e a d  t o  s o c i a l  i s o l a t i o n  (Lensk i ,  1 9 5 6 ) ,  
psycho-phys io log ica l  symptoms ( Jackson ,  19621, and d e s i r e  f o r  
change i n  t h e  power d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  s o c i e t y  (Goffman, 1 9 5 7 ) .  
I n  t h e  a r e a  of p o l i t i c a l  s o c i o l o g y ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  Wi l ey ' s  
h y p o t h e s i s  on i n c o n s i s t e n t  ' c l a s s  a t t r i b u t e s ,  most  s t u d i e s  of  
s t a t u s  i n c o n s i s t e n c y  have found p o s i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i t h  
p o l i t i c a l  l i b e r a l i s m  and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  Democratic 
p a r t y  (Lensk i ,  1954, 1967; Sega l  and Knoke, 1 9 6 8 ) .  A t  l e a s t  
one  a u t h o r ,  however, ha s  sugges ted  t h a t  s t a t u s  i n c o n s i s t e n t s  
on o c c u p a t i o n a l ,  e d u c a t f o n a l  and income dimensions  may seek  a  
r e s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e i r  c o n f l i c t  th rough  r igh t -wing  extremism 
(Rush, 1967 ) .  The e x i s t e n c e  of a  t h e o r y  and e m p i r i c a l  l i t e r a -  
t u r e  on s t a t u s  i n c o n s i s t e n c y  f a c i l i t a t e s  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of  
t h e  p o l i t i c a l  consequences of c l a s s  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s .  C l a s s  
s i t u a t i o n s ,  f o l l owing  Weber, can  b e  c l a s s i f i e d  acco rd ing  t o  
r e l a t i v e  s t a n d i n g  i n  l a b o r ,  commodity and c r e d i t  ma rke t s ,  and 
t h e  s t a n d i n g  can  be  r e p r e s e n t e d  e x c l u s i v e l y  by "economic 
i n t e r e s t s  i n  p o s s e s s i o n  of goods and income o p p o r t u n i t i e s " .  
S t r a t i f i c a t i o n  by such "pure"  economic c l a s s  v a r i a b l e s  may n o t  
be e n t i r e l y  s u c c e s s f u l  i n  t h e  American c a s e ,  s i n c e  such  c l a s s  
-8- 
i n d i c a t o r s  a l s o  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  s o c i a l  s t a t u s  through t h e  p r e s t i g e  
and l i f e  s t y l e s  provided by d i f f e r e n t i a l  placement i n  t h e  
economic markets .  For example, an  o c c u p a t i o n a l  group may 
approximate  a  c l a s s  when it d i f f e r e n t i a t e s  employers ( p r o p e r t i e d  
pe r sons )  from employees (non-proper t ied  p e r s o n n e l ) .  But t h e  
o c c u p a t i o n a l  h i e r a r c h y  which r e f l e c t s  s o c i a l  honor and p r e s t i g e  
i s  a  s t a t u s  v a r i a b l e  a s  w e l l ,  The in te rdependence  of s t a t u s  
upon c l a s s  must be kep t  i n  mind d u r i n g  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  t e s t  of 
t h e  c l a s s - i n c o n s i s t e n c y  theory .  
METHOD 
A n a t i o n a l  survey o f .  households was- conducted by t h e  Sur- 
vey Research Center  a t  t h e  U n i v e r s i t y  of' Michigan i n  1 9 6 5 ,  
sampling economic behavior of a 2213-subject  c r o s s - s e c t i o n  of 
t h e  United S t a t e s .  Economic d a t a  ga the red  inc luded  i t e m s  which 
were grouped a  p r i o r i  f o r  t h e  p r e s e n t  s tudy  i n t o  t h r e e  c a t e -  
g o r i e s  'corresponding t o  Weberk t h r e e  economic markets:  c r e d i t  
( a u t o  f i n a n c i n g ,  l i q u i d  a s s e t s ,  house v a l u e s ,  annual  income 
and income r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  p a s t  y e a r ) ;  commodity (automobi les ,  
a p p l i a n c e s ,  farm o r  bus ines s  ownersh ip j ;  and l a b o r  ( i n d u s t r y ,  
occupa t ion ,  and employment s t a t u s  i n  primary job,  second job,  
self-employment, and c r i t e r i a  f o r  g e t t i n g  a h e a d ) .  Each i t e m  
w i t h i n  a  market  was b i f u r c a t e d  i n t o  h igh  and low rank ings ,  
g e n e r a l l y  on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  t h e  v a r i a b l e ,  o r ,  
i l i - t h e  c a s e  of l a b o r  v a r i a b l e s  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  occupa t iona l  
s t a t u s .  Each dichotomized i tem was c r o s s - t a b u l a t e d  wi th  a l l  
o t h e r s  i n  t h e  same market and Q v a l u e s  f o r  t h e  a s s o c i a t i o n  
determined f o r  each 2 x 2 t a b l e ,  Two p r i n c i p l e . c l u s t e r s  of 
i t e m s  emerged i n  each market  on t h e  b a s i s  of t h e s e  Q v a l u e s  
and were combined i n t o  s i x  a d d i t i v e  i n d i c e s ,  An i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
f i n a l  p o s i t i o n  i n  each market  index is-  t h e  sum of va lues .  f o r  
h igh  s t a n d i n g  o r  low s t and ing  on each  v a r i a b l e  t h a t  i s  a 
component of t h e  i n d e x ,  Table  I p r e s e n t s  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  i n  
each index and c r i t e r i a  f o r  ranking  and p o i n t s  f o r  each r ank ,  
TABLE I 
Cons t ruc t ion  of Economic Market Ind ices  
1. CREDIT:  Liquid Asse t s  (has  some=2; has  none=l)  + House 
Value (owns house=2; n o t  owner-1) S Income (over  
$5000=2; under $5000=1) + Income P a s t  Year 
(higher-2;  lower o r  s ame=l ) .  
2 .  COMMODITY: Number of automobi les  i n  fami ly  u n i t  (code 
e x a c t  number) + number of app l i ances :  washer,  
d r y e r ,  dishwasher (code t w ~ c e  t h e  number). 
3. OWNERSHIP: Produc t ive  C a p i t a l  [owns farm o r  bus iness=2;  
n e i t h e r = l ) .  
4 .  LABOR N I C H E  : Occupation ( p r o f e s s i o n a l ,  managerial=3 ; 
c l e r i c a l ,  sales and s k i l l e d  workers=2; semi- 
and u n - s k i l l e d = = l )  P Indus t ry  ( t e r t i a r y z 3 ;  
secondary-2; p r imary=l )  ,+ Employment S t a t u s  
(employed=3; r e t i r e d = 2 ;  unemployed=l) 9 
Cond i t i ona l  2nd Job  ( i f  employed, having 2nd 
job=l ,  no t  having==2; i f  r e t i r e d  o r  unem- 
ployed,  2nd job=2, no 2nd jobz l ;  second job 
i s  economic b e n e f i t  an l a t t e r  c a s e ,  a  s t a t u s  
de t r imen t  i n  f o r m e r ) .  
5. LABOR CONTROL OF LIFE CHANCES: Occupation ( p r o f e s s i o n a l ,  
t e c h n i c a l  and manager ia l=2;  c l e r i c a l ,  s a l e s  
t o  b l u e  c o . l l a r = l )  6 Self-employment ( s e l f -  
employed=2; employed by o thers -1)  t G e t t i n g  
ahead depends on (achievement c r i t e r i a = 2 ;  
a s c r i p t i v e  c r i t e r i a - 1 )  . 
6 .  DEBT: Type of a u t o  f i n a n c i n g  ( ca sh  o r  no purchase=2; 
i n s t a l l m e n t  d e b t = l )  . 
Table  I1 shows bo th  t h e  u n i v a r i a t e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  s c o r e s  f o r  
each index and t h e  subsequent  b i f u r c a t i o n  of  each index i n t o  
h igh  and low ranks  a t  t h e  approximate weighted mean, 
TABLE 11 
Univa r i a t e  D i s t r i b u t i o n  of Scores* and Percen tage  i n  Ranks 
I N D E X  LOW RANK 
1. C r e d i t  4 5 
1 6 %  3 0 %  
2 .  Commodity 3 4 5 6 
1 6 %  22% 9% 1 7 %  
3 .  Ownership 1 
86% 
4 .  Labor Niche 4 5 6  - 4 
- 6 %  4% 4 ,%% 20% 
5. Labor Cont ro l  3 
5 4 %  
6. Debt 1 
1 6 %  
*Upper number i n  each c e l l  i s  index score.<, 
H I G H  RANK 
The dichotomy of  ranks  on each index were c r o s s -  
t a b u l a t e d  wi th  t h e  o t h e r  f i v e  i n d i c e s ,  Q v a l u e s  of  a s soc i a -  
t i o n  f o r  i n d i c e s  w e r e  c a l c u l a t e d  and t h e  r e s u l t a n t  v a l u e s  
w e r e  en t e r ed  i n t o  a  ma t r ix  which was then  permuted by 
symmetric r e o r d e r i n g  of  columns and rows t o  c l u s t e r  t h e  h igh  
Q v a l u e s  a long  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  d i agona l  ( s e e  Table  111). "Debt" 
w a s  e l imina t ed  from f u r t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  a s  it showed l i t t l e  
f a c e  v a l i d i t y  t o  o v e r - a l l  c r e d i t  s t a n d i n g ,  The " c r e d i t "  index 
i s  somewhat weakened. i n  i t s  f a i l u r e  . t o  measure d e b t  on auto-  
mobile f i n a n c i n g ,  b u t  it was r e t a i n e d  f o r  i t s  h i g h e r  a s soc i a -  
t i o n  wi th  t h r e e  of the-  o t h e r  i n d i c e s .  S lmi . la r ly ,  "ownership",  
wh ich -wh i l e  showing weak . . a s soc i a t i on .wi th  f o u r  i n d i c e s ,  was 
h i g h l y  a s s o c i a t e d  with.. " labor .  c o n t r o l  of  l i f e  chances" , .  and 
was r e t a i n e d  because.of  appa ren t  f a c e  v a l i d a t i o n .  
TABLE 111 
Q Values of A s s o c i a t i o n . f o r  I n d i c e s  
CONTROL 
NICHE . 6 5  
COMMODITY . 3 7  .54 
CREDIT . 3 9  .77 - 6 1  
OWNERSHIP -80 - 2 1 1  - 1 2  -,12 
DEBT -.18 - , 4 1  - . 4 4  . 05  - 0 0 4  
Three of  t h e  i n d i c e s  f i n a l l y  accep ted ,  " c r e d i t " ,  "com- 
modity" and "ownership" a r e  based a lmos t  e x c l u s i v e l y  on "pure" 
economic v a r i a b l e s - - t h e - r a n k -  a  person occupies  depends on ly  on 
t h e  q u a n t i t y  of goods-.owned, t h a t  i s ,  p rope r ty .  These i n d i c e s ,  
fo l lowing  Weber, most c l e a r l y . r e p r e s e n t  c l a s s  s i t u a t i o n s  i n  
t h r e e  marke ts ,  a l though  t h e  dichotomies  i n  t h e  f i r s t  two cases  
a r e  between more and less p r o p e r t i e d  pe r sons ,  r a t h e r  t han  
between p r o p e r t i e d  and non-proper t ied ,  Wi ley ' s  hypothes i s  
s a y s  t h a t  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  i n  r ank ings  on t h e s e  t h r e e  i n d i c e s  
should  r e s u l t  i n  p o l i t i c a l  p r e f e r e n c e s  f o r  t h e  r i g h t .  P r e -  
sumably such p re fe rences  w i l l  be r e l a t e d  t o  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
w i t h  t h e  Republican p a r t y .  
The remaining i n d i c e s ,  " l a b o r  n iche"  and l a b o r  c o n t r o l  
a r e  composed of  more ambiguous economic i t e m s ,  Both r e f l e c t .  
s t a t u s  and class components, p a r t i c u l a r l y  s o c i a l  honor a t t a c h e d  
t o  o c c u p a t i o n a l  h i e r a r c h i e s  and pe rce ived  c r i t e r i a  f o r  g e t t i n g  
ahead. The p a r t i s a n  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  i n c o n s i s t e n t  i n d i v i d u a l s  
on t h e s e  i n d i c e s  should n o t  be a s  s t r o n g l y  r ight-wing a s  f o r  
t h e  o t h e r  t h r e e ;  i f  t h e  status-components a r e  t h e  more power- 
f u l ,  i n c o n s i s t e n c y  should r e s u l t  i n s p a r t i s a n  p re fe rence  f o r  t h e  
l e f t .  Following Lenski ,  w e  s h a l l  d e f i n e  l e f t  p a r t i s a n s h i p  a s  
  en ski (1967) has  developed a  s imple  method f o r  t e s t i n g  
t h e  i n f l u e n c e  of i ncons i s t ency  f a c t o r s ,  I f  two independent 
v a r i a b l e s  have an i n t e r a c t i v e  e f f e c t  on a  t h i rd ,dependen t  
v a r i a b l e ,  it can be d e t e c t e d  by t a k i n g  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n - t h e  
sum of  i n c o n s i s t e n t . c e l l s  from the . sum of  c o n s i s t e n t  c e l l s  i n  
a  2 x 2 t a b l e .  I f  t h e  main e f f e c t  o f  t h e  independent v a r i a b l e s  
i s  s i m p l y  a d d i t i v e ,  t h e  sums should  b e - e q u a l  and t h e i r  d i f f e r -  
?. ence  be zero.  I f ,  however, t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n . e f f e c t  accompanied 
by a  stress i s  due t o  i ncons i s t ency  and t h e  dependent v a r i a b l e  
i s  an i n d i r e c t  measure of t h i s  stress, t h e  sum of i n c o n s i s t e n t  
c e l l s  should be h ighe r  than t h e  sum of c o n s i s t e n t  c e l l s .  
Each pair of dichotomized indices was. cross-tabulated 
with political partisanship, and the percentage of Republican 
! 
partisans- entered-. irr each cell of the 2 x 2 table.' The , i 
differences in the.sums of diagonals were computed and are 
! I  
presented. in Tab1.e 1V.- 
I 
-TABLE IV 
Effects of Inconsistency on- Party Identification 
Economic Markets Pure Economic Markets 




COMMODITY -6.1- +1.5 
1. For example, if the fo1lowing.entries represent levels 
of variable C in each cell of the cross-tabulation of 
variables A and B, the difference in sum of consistent 
cells (high-high and low-low) and the sum of inconsistent 
cells (high-low and low-high) shows the effect of incon- 
sistency upon variable C: 
Variable A 
(60 t 20) - (30 + 40) = +lo% 
High .Low 
effect of inconsistency 
High is increase of variable 




A positive sign for an entry in Table IV indicates a sur- 
plus of Republicans for inconsistent cells while a negative 
sign indicates a Republican surplus for consistent cells and 
surplus of Democrats in inconsistent cells compared to consis- 
tent cel.1~. In the aggregate, the three "pure" economic class 
indices show a slight but probably insignificant tendency for 
Republican preference among class inconsistents. Wiley's 
hypothesis does not gain confirmation from these data. 
The interaction of the two mixed status-class indices 
(quadrant two) shows a similar slight but opposite effect of 
preference for the party of the left. 
Where the "pure" class and mixed status-class variables 
intersect (quadrant three) , the trend is less clear. The 
index of control of life chances appears to exercise a decisive 
influence on persons with inconsistent standing in that dimen- 
sion and the "pure" class dimensions to identify with the left. 
The interaction of labor niche and the "pure" class variables 
seems to be less consistent than control. 
A further analysis was made by splitting the sample into 
two groups based on age (those below and those above 45 years) 
and replicating the table. The results for comparison of 
similar indices, shown in Table V, indicate markedly different 
preferences depending upon position in the life cycle. Among 
those persons under 45 years, inconsistent standing in the 
"pure" markets produced a marked preference for the party of 
the right, apparently confirming Wiley's hypothesis. In the 
same age group, inconsistants on the mixed class-status indices 
also strongly preferred the Democratic party, also apparently 
confirming Lenski's hypothesis on status inconsistency. For 
the cohort group over 45, there was a slight but evident 
tendency to the opposite effeots; since the bulk of the sample 
(about 60 per cent) was in the latter group, the weight of 
numbers had influenced the total sample in the direction of 
older groups. For the interaction of class indices with mixed 
indices, the effect of inconsistency in both age groups was in 
the same direction as the total population. 
TABLE V 
Effects of Inconsistency by Age Levels 
INTERACTION TYPE BELOW 4 5 OVER 45 
Control by Niche -10.7 + 4-2 
Credit by Commodity + 2.6 + 3.2 
Credit by Ownership +lo. 7 - 2.5 
Ownership by Commodity + 4.9 - 4.7 
An attempt was made to relate individual inconsistencies 
to partisanship by creating profiles of individual class con- 
figurations. Where previously two indices at a time were 
: compared for the effect of inconsistency, an individual score 
for each sample subject was created by summing high and low 
ranking values for the two principle clusters of indices dis- 
covered in the previous step. Table VI shows.the univariate 
d i s t r i b u t i o n s  f o r  both  i n d i v i d u a l  c l a s s  p r o f i l e s  and t h e  per-  
cen tage  of Republican p a r t i s a n s  i n  each c o n f i g u r a t i o n .  
TABLE V I  
I n d i v i d u a l  P r o f i l e s  of  P a r t i s a n s h i p  
"Pure" C l a s s  I n d i c e s  
Cons i s t en t  Two Low One Low C o n s i s t e n t  
Low One High Two High High 
% Republican 23% 29% 34% 37% 
i\J (728) (756) (625) ( 1 0 4 )  
Mixed S ta tus -C las s  I n d i c e s  
C o n s i s t e n t  Low Mixed C o n s i s t e n t  High 
% Republican 2 4 %  26% 34% 
N ( 4  99 (828) (886) 
The c l a s s  i ncons i s t ency  e f f e c t  does  n o t  appear  t o  o p e r a t e  
i n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  c a s e s .  Ra ther ,  a  s imple  a d d i t i v e  r u l e  seems 
t o  apply :  a s  economic s t and ing  i n c r e a s e s ,  it i s  accompanied 
r i s i n g  Republican a f f i l i a t i o n .  However, a  comparison of t h e  
agg rega t e  numbers i n  each c o n f i g u r a t i o n  sugges t s  t h a t  more 
persons  i n  "pure"  economic markets  a r e  of  i n c o n s i s t e n t  c l a s s  
s i t u a t i o n  than  a r e  persons  i n  t h e  mixed c l a s s - s t a t u s  s i t u a t i o n .  
DISCUSSION 
. The two p r i n c i p l e  index c l u s t e r s  t h a t  emerged and t h e  
d i f f e r i n g  p o l i t i c a l  e f f e c t s  of i n c o n s i s t e n c y  i n t e r a c t i o n  have 
i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  a comprehensive theory .  of s o c i a l  rank ing  i n -  
c o n s i s t e n c i e s .  The c l u s t e r  of "pure"  economic a t t r i b u t e s - -  
i nvo lv ing  c r e d i t ,  commodity and l a b o r  markets--on t h e  agg rega t e  
show a tendency to right.identification among young class in- 
consistants. Both of the indices which involve components of 
a status and class nature show an effect of preference for the 
party of the left. The predominant preference for the Demo- 
cratic party among inconsistants where the two clusters inter- 
sect nay reflect the impact of the status aspect of the mixed 
indices, particularly the socio-psychological aspects of control 
of life chances. It remains to develop an explanation why 
economic class inconsistency has one political consequence and 
social status inconsistency promotes another. 
One explanation for the different consequences of status- 
and class-inconsistency would emphasize the motivations for 
change aroused by each type. In a study of mobility, Lipset 
and Bendix write: 
"Because a person's self-evaluation reflects the 
ranking he receives from his fellows, he will either 
try continually to increase his prestige rank as an 
individual, or he will seek group support for his 
claims to prestige. In either case, it may be said 
that people like to protect their class positions 
in order to protect their egos and improve their 
class position in order to enhance their egos. 
(Bendix and Lipset, 1960: 61). 
A distinction should be made on the princ.iple of stratification 
to which this striving is supposed to apply. In the termino- 
logy of the present paper, "class" has been used to mean a 
ranking according,to quantities of economic goods and income 
opportunities; "status" applies to ranking systems only where 
social honor is involved. A case will now be made for the 
hypothesis that inconsistencies in status dimensions are 
psychologically more disturbing and hence more likely to 
e l i c i t  response  t h a n  are c l a s s  imbalances and t h a t ,  f u r t h e r ,  
r e s o l u t i o n  of s t a t u s  c o n f l i c t s  i s  sought  through p o l i t i c a l  
a c t i v i t y  more r e a d i l y  t han  i s  r e s o l u t i o n  of c l a s s  i ncons i s t ency .  
S o c i a l  m o b i l i t y  i n  American s o c i e t y ,  whi le  g e n e r a l l y  t h e  
same l e v e l  a s  o t h e r  Western i n d u s t r i a l  n a t i o n s  (Bendix and 
L i p s e t ,  1960: 1 3 ) ,  because of an h i s t o r i c a l  conf luence  of 
p o l i t i c a l  and s o c i a l  democrat ic  i n s t i t u t i o n s  has  t h e  appear-  
ance of being more open and achievement-or iented t h a n  i n  o t h e r  
n a t i o n s .  The consequence f o r  persons  i n  c o n s i s t e n t l y  low o r  
ambiguous c l a s s  s i t u a t i o n s  i s  a b e l i e f  i n  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of 
c l a s s  change, f o r  o n e s e l f  o r  o n e ' s  o f f s p r i n g .  Improvement 
of o n e ' s  s t a n d i n g  i n  t h e  t h r e e  "pure"  economic i n d i c e s  i nvo lves  
on ly  t h e  achievement of more consumption-production goods o r  
a t t a i n i n g  more educa t ion  and t h u s  improved occupation-income 
chances .  An examinat ion of t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  "pure"  c l a s s  
c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  i n  Table  V I  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  few (about  5%)  i n d i v i d -  
/ 
u a l s  i n  American s o c i e t y  occupy a  h igh ly  c r y s t a l l i z e d  p o s i t i o n .  
The mixed c l a s s  s i t u a t i o n  i s  dominant. Some i n d i v i d u a l s  w i l l  
be i n  t h e  p roces s  of assembling households ,  improving l i f e  
chances and e v e n t u a l l y  moving t o  more c o n s i s t e n t  c l a s s  s tand-  
i n g .  A n t i c i p a t i o n  f o r  moving t o  g r e a t e r  economic s e c u r i t y  
undoubtedly has  t h e  e f f e c t  of i n f l u e n c i n g  p o l i t i c a l  persuas ion  
i n  c o n s e r v a t i v e  d i r e c t i o n s .  A s  a  g e n e r a l  r u l e  we might  sug- 
g e s t  t h a t  any improvement of c l a s s  s i t u a t i o n  w i l l  i n  prob- 
a b i l i t y  r e s u l t  i n  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  p a r t y  of conservat ism 
and.  t h e  s t a t u s  quo, i n  America, t h e  Republican p a r t y .  
The p r e f e r e n c e  among younger pe r sons  i n  i n c o n s i s t e n t  
economic c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h e  p a r t y  of  t h e  r i g h t  rnay i n d i c a t e  
such a n  a n t i c i p a t i o n  of becoming more h i g h l y  c o n s i s t e n t  and 
t h u s  assuming t h e  p o l i t i c a l  s t y l e  t h a t  Table  VI i n d i c a t e s  i s  
p r e v a l e n t  among t h e  h igh ly  c o n s i s t e n t ,  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  f o r  
younger pe r sons ,  i ncons i s t ency  may n o t  s ew a s  e x c r u c i a t i n g  
and a s  p e r s o n a l l y  i n s o l u b l e  a s  i t  might  be f o r  persons  w e l l  
i n t o  t h e i r  prime who have no t  ga ined  by t h e i r  pe r sona l  e f f o r t s  
a  more h i g h l y  i n t e g r a t e d  economic e x i s t e n c e .  For o l d e r  per-  
sons  i n  i n c o n s i s  t e n t  pos.i+,ior_s, t h e  p o i i t  i.cal. so1u.t i on  t o  
t h e i r  stress nay be through suppor t  of the p a r t y  cf change, 
t h e  Democratic p a r t y .  
S t a t u s  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  also a r e  o f t e c  l e s s  s o l u b l e  bj7 
i n d i v i d u a l  achievement.  S t a t u s  dimensions normally i n v o l v e  
a n  exchange r e l a t i o n  between twc ox rr?o.re iniiiv!..dual.s or cj;:oups 
The b a s i s  of t h e  exchange rday he economi .~ ,  b a t  by t h e  iiefin2.- 
t i o n  of  s t a t u s ,  such goods and s e r v i c e s  a l s o  s e r v e  a sy i -~bo l i c  
purpose f o r  t h e  exchange of s o c i a l  honor or  d e f e r e n c e ,  as  
r e p r e s e n t e d  by t h e  " l i f e  s t y l e "  o f  "lif 2 cha.nces2 i n d i v i d u a l s  
and groups ma in t a in .  The s t a t u s  dimensions r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  the 
p r e s e n t  s tudy  a r e  a lmost  e x c l u s i v e l y  i n  :--he l.aber n a r k e t .  The 
p sycho log ica l  s t r a i n s  r e s u l t i s g  f ron i n c o n s i s t e n c y  betveen 
o c c u p a t i o n a l  l o c a t i o n  and pe rce ived  control sx.jer I L f  e  oppor- 
t u n i t i e s  may be s u f f i c i e n t  t o  c r e a t e  desire for change.. bu t  
t h e  chances  of  doing something i n  .;:he i n d i v i 6 x a i  .case appear  
l i m i t e d .  L i p s e t  and Ber~?. i>;  ! 1965 :  1 3 8 )  r iote t h a t  whi le  much 
p e r s o n a l  r t ~ o b i l i t y  does  ocstlr w i t h i n  a  l i f e t i m e  w i t h i n  t h e  l a b o r  
marke t ,  t h e r e  i s  " l i t t l e  permanent o c c u p a t i o n a l  movement 
a c r o s s "  t h e  manual-nonrnanual l i n e .  Given t h e  d i s j u n c t u r e  
b e t w e e n ' s t a t u s  e x p e c t a t i o n s  and t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  l i m i t a t i o n s  on  
e r a d i c a t i o n  o f  i n e q u a l i t i e s ,  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  i n d i v i d u a l  
m o b i l i t y  i s  g roup  m o b i l i t y .  The p o l i t i c a l  m a n i f e s t a t i o n  i s  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  p a r t y  of  change--the Democrat ic  p a r t y  
i n -  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s .  
When " p u r e "  c l a s s  and mixed s t a t u s - c l a s s  i n d i c e s  w e r e  
c r o s s e d ,  t h e  index  of  c o n t r o l  of  l i f e  chances  e x e r c i s e s  a  
d e c i s i v e  e f f e c t  on c r e a t i n g  l e f t  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  among incon- 
s i s t a n t s .  A s  t h e  p r e s e n t  s t u d y  was unde r t aken  t o  r e f u t e  t h e  
s i m p l i f i e d  n o t i o n  o f  economic de te rmin i sm,  t h i s  e f f e c t  i s  o f  
c r u c i a l  impor tance  t o  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  unde r s t and ing  of Ainerican 
p o l i t i c a l  h i s t o r y .  Marx d e c l a r e d  " i t  i s  n o t  t h e  consc iousnes s  
o f  men t h a t  d e t e r m i n e s  t h e i r  -be ing ,  b u t ,  on  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  
t h e i r  s o c i a l  be ing  t h a t  d e t e r m i n e s  t h e i r  consc iousnes s . "  
(Marx, 1904: 291 ) .  The awareness  o f  c o n t r o l  ove r  l i f e  chances  
may be based upon p r eced ing  economic s t r u c t u r e s ,  b u t  a s  i n d i -  
c a t e d  by t h e  p r e v i o u s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  l i f e  chances  i n  t h e  l a b o r  
ma rke t ,  i s  l i k e l y  t o  be r e l a t i v e l y  s t a b l e  o v e r  a  l i f e t i m e .  
Thus c o n t r o l  ove r  l i f e  chances  assumes t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of  a n  
a s c r i b e d  dimension;  t h e  i n d i c e s  w i t h  which it i n t e r a c t s  a r e ,  
r e l a t i v e l y  speak ing ,  of a n  ach i eved  dimension.  P r ev ious  
s t u d i e s  have  shown t h a t  a s c r i bed -ach i eved  compar isons  produce  
t h e  g r e a t e s t  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  t h e  p a r t y  o f  t h e  l e f t  among s t a t u s  
i n c o n s i s t a n t s  i  en ski , 1967; ~ e g a l  and Knoke, ,19691 ; t h e  same 
p a t t e r n  i s  e v i d e n t l y  t h e  c a s e  among c l a s s  i n c o n s i s t a n t s .  
We can o n l y  o f f e r  a  t e n t a t i v e  hypo thes i s  why s t a t u s  v a r i a -  
b l e s  c r e a t e  an o v e r - r i d i n g  e f f e c t  on c l a s s  v a r i a b l e s .  A s  
p r e v i o u s l y  no ted ,  Weber be l i eved  t h a t  c l a s s  c o n f l i c t  has  
exper ienced  an  h i s t o r i c a l  s h i f t  from consumption c r e d i t  t o  
commodity t o  l a b o r  markets .  But t h e  s t r u g g l e  i n  t h e  1 9 t h  cen- 
t u r y  ove r  t h e  p r i c e  of t h e  j u s t  wage, which occupied t h e  
a t t e n t i o n s  of bo th  Marx and Weber, ha s  been l a r g e l y  r e so lved  
w i t h  t h e  growth of b i g  bus ines s  and l abo r  un ions .  The counte r -  
v a i l i n g  powers have,  a s  a  consequence, rendered  t h e  c l a s s  
s t r u c t u r e  more c o n s i s t e n t  a c r o s s  a l l  markets  by squeezing o u t  
t h e  o l d  middle  c l a s s  of smal l  e n t r e p r e n e u r s  and fa rmers  between 
b u s i n e s s  and l a b o r  (Wiley, 1967: 5 3 9 ) .  P o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  a r e  
less c l e a r l y  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th  one p a r t i c u l a r  c l a s s  and t h e  
s t r u g g l e  f o r  s t a t u s  has  emerged a s  a  major p o l i t i c a l  b a t t l e -  
ground. P o l i t i c s  has  become l e s s  a f i g h t  f o r  a  s l i c e  of t h e  
economic p i e  t han  an  argument over  t h e  d i g n i t y  w i t h  which it 
i s  served .  
I f  t h e  conc lus ions  of t h i s  a n a l y s i s  and t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  
t r e n d  a r e  v a l i d ,  t h e  a t t empt  t o  reduce  American p o l i t i c a l  
2 .  The d i s t i n c t i o n s  of a s c r i b e d  and achieved s t a t u s  v a r i a b l e s  
i n c l u d e s  ones  n o t  u t i l i z e d  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t  s tudy ;  t h e s e  
i n c l u d e  r a c e ,  r e l i g i o n  and e t h n i c i t y  ( a s c r i b e d )  and edu- 
c a t i o n ,  income and occupa t ion  ( ach ieved ) .  The d i s t i n c t i o n  
f o r  c l a s s  i n d i c e s  made here i s  - t h a t  r e l a t i v e l y  c o n t r o l  of 
l i f e  chances may appear a s  determined by t h e  l a b o r  market  - - -  
s t r u c t u r e ,  wh i l e  goods ownership and c r e d i t  s t a n d i n g  may 
appear  more amenable t o  i n d i v i d u a l  e f f o r t s  t o  improve, 
behavior  t o  a s imple  economic determinism i s  f u t i l e .  P o l i t i c a l  
i n t e r e s t s  may have a  founda t ion  i n  economic c l a s s  s i t u a t i o n ,  
b u t  t hey  a r e  confounded by an o v e r l a y ,  an  i n c r e a s i n g l y  impor tan t  
s t a t u s  c o n f l i c t  t h a t  emerges whenever b a s i c  economic problems 
have been so lved  by major soc ia l .  g roups  i n  a  s o c i e t y ,  A c l u e  
t o  t h e  format ion  of  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i s a n s h i p  and a  u s e f u l  t o o l  
i n  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  of such s t a t u s  c o n f l i c t s , a r e  t h o s e  persons  
occupying ambiguous p o s i t i o n s  a long  t h e  major axes  of s o c i a l  
c o n f l i c t .  
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